Alcohol Ignition Interlocks: Magic Bullet or Poison Pill? by Neugebauer, Gregory T.
Volume II - Article 2 
Alcohol Ignition Interlocks: Magic Bullet or Poison Pill? 
Gregory T. Neugebauer 
Spring 2002 
 
Copyright © 2002 University of Pittsburgh School of Law  
Journal of Technology Law and Policy  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") recently 
published some sobering statistics on drinking and driving. [1]   A person dies on 
America’s highways in an alcohol-related fatality every 33 minutes.  A person is injured 
every 2 minutes.  Approximately one third of all Americans will experience an alcohol-
related crash at least once in their lives.  A staggering 1.4 million people "one for every 
132 licensed drivers" were arrested for driving under the influence in 1998 alone.  As if 
this human toll is not alarming enough, alcohol-related crashes cost Americans over 
$100 billion annually. 
 
In July of 1998, the federal government enacted yet another statute in a long line 
of laws aimed at encouraging states to stem the carnage occurring on our nation’s 
highways.  However, this statute, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century 
("TEA 21") Restoration Act, [2] has one dramatically new provision.  Instead of relying 
exclusively on the traditional putative measures designed to curb impaired driving, e.g. 
incarceration, license suspension, vehicle seizure, it adopts a novel, technological 
approach.  The Act calls for the installation of alcohol ignition interlocks in the vehicles 
of repeat offenders. [3]  
 
An alcohol ignition interlock prevents a driver from operating a vehicle unless her 
breath sample has an alcohol level below a preset limit. [4]    While such devices have 
been around since the 1960's, recent technical advances have made them easy to install, 
easy to operate, affordable, [5] accurate, ethanol specific, and "most importantly" difficult 
to circumvent. [6]   Alcohol ignition interlocks have emerged as a powerful tool in 
keeping recidivist DUI [7] offenders from driving drunk.  
 
Not surprisingly, the Congress, [8] government agencies, [9] advocacy groups, 
[10] and state courts [11] have welcomed these devices with barely a ripple of dissent.  
Today, over forty states, [12] including Pennsylvania, [13] can require drivers convicted 
of multiple DUI offenses to install an ignition interlock device as a condition for 
restoration of driving privileges.  The strongest proponents of interlocks even advocate 
making it mandatory safety equipment, like seat belts and air bags. [14]   Before the 
interlock bandwagon rolls too far, however, it may be prudent to consider some of the 
legal consequences of this new technology. 
 
While over forty states have adopted interlock measures, how firm is the 
constitutional footing of these statutes?  Even if such laws are appropriate for repeat 
offenders, what about a universal, national interlock program?  Could an interlock in 
every vehicle have unforeseen consequences?  Interlocks might be an effective means to 
curb drunk driving, perhaps even the most effective, but are there any unforeseen liability 
and privacy issues to consider? 
 
This comment examines some of the legal issues associated with alcohol ignition 
interlocks.  It looks at interlocks from the perspective of both the DUI offender as well as 
the non-offender.   Part I of this comment introduces interlock technology.  Part II 
examines interlock statutes and how the courts have interpreted and applied them.  Since 
interlock statutes are the progeny of state law, the focus is mainly on state courts.  Part III 
evaluates possible constitutional challenges to interlock statutes.  Part IV looks at the 
consequences of requiring this device in all vehicles, like airbags and seat belts.  It also 
suggests legislative guidelines should Congress see fit to implement such a measure. 
 
I. Interlock Technology 
 
The typical unit of measurement of blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") used 
throughout the United States is percent (%). [15]   A BAC of 0.10% represents 0.1 grams 
of ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood, [16] which equates to 0.1 grams per 210 liters of 
breath. [17]   Indiana enacted the first BAC limit of 0.15% in 1939. [18]   Today, all 
states have BAC limits of either 0.10% or 0.08%, with 0.08% being the most common. 
[19]   Measurement of BAC via a deep lung, or "alveolar," air sample is the basic 
operating principle of most modern ignition interlocks. [20]  
 
Ignition interlocks employ one of two basic types of sensors to measure the breath 
alcohol concentration "BrAC": a semiconductor sensor or an electrochemical sensor. [21]   
Each type of sensor has its relative advantages and disadvantages, although both types are 
commercially available. 
 
The semiconductor sensor, also called a solid-state or Taguchi sensor, measures 
alcohol by detecting the change in electrical resistance of a circuit exposed to volatile 
hydrocarbons. [22]   The major advantages of this sensor are its accuracy, low price, and 
its durability. [23]   However, this sensor suffers from two significant drawbacks.  First, 
the device requires frequent calibration. [24]   Second, the device is not specific to 
alcohol.  Many hydrocarbons including motor vehicle exhaust and even cigarette smoke 
affect the response. [25] Either of these drawbacks may produce an unacceptably high 
frequency of false positive readings, which greatly hinders the efficacy of the interlock 
program.  False positive readings unjustly prevent the driver from operating the vehicle, 
and they prevent the program supervisor from determining whether the operator is 
attempting to drink and drive.  The electrochemical or fuel cell sensor overcomes both 
these drawbacks. 
 
An electrochemical sensor measures alcohol concentration by detecting the 
electrical current generated by the oxidation of alcohol. [26]   This sensor has greater 
stability in calibration, which reduces maintenance requirements. [27]   More 
importantly, the device is specific to ethyl alcohol, thereby greatly reducing false 
positives. [28]   Its relative disadvantage is its higher cost. [29]  
 
While both the semiconductor and fuel cell sensor technologies have clear relative 
advantages and disadvantages, either type of sensor can perform satisfactorily. [30]   This 
is because an ignition interlock's usefulness does not depend on its ability to make precise 
distinctions in BAC levels.  Its purpose is simply to determine whether a person's BAC is 
above or below a preset lockout limit. [31]   As the fundamental purpose of the ignition 
interlock is to prevent an intoxicated person from operating a vehicle, the BAC cutoff is 
usually safely set to a small, non-zero value, typically 0.025%. [32]   This small level 
compensates for drift in the zero-point calibration value, thereby greatly reducing false 
positives, while, at the same time, minimizing the risk of an alcohol-impaired driver 
operating a vehicle. [33]  
 
In addition to advances in alcohol sensor technology, there have been 
improve-ments in the prevention of interlock circumvention and tampering. 
Circumven-tion or tampering refers to any attempt to bypass the ignition interlock 
through mechanical or electrical means, or by providing a bogus air sample. [34]    A key 
tool in hampering attempts to bypass the interlock is a data recorder. [35]  
 
A data recorder documents all uses of the vehicle as well as all attempts to 
circumvent or tamper with the device. [36]   Among the parameters recorded are: date 
and time of vehicle use, pass/fail records, BrAC levels, all attempts to disengage the 
device, and maintenance records. [37]   A means for backing up the data is necessary in 
case of power interruption. [38]   Along with the data recorder, another anti-
circumvention feature is the “rolling retest” requirement.  This requires the driver to 
supply another breath sample between 5 and 30 minutes after starting the vehicle. [39]   
The rolling retest is the most effective means to thwart circumvention of the interlock by 
having a surrogate provide a breath sample at the curb. [40]   Failure of the rolling retest 
does not risk catastrophe by disabling the vehicle.  The data recorder merely logs the 
failure. [41]   Additional appropriate action might include flashing the headlights, setting 
off an alarm, or locking out the driver unless she reports to a service center after a 
specified number of days. [42]    
 
Today there are at least eight companies manufacturing alcohol ignition 
interlocks. [43]   In response to the growing number of states requiring “certified” 
interlocks for DUI offenders, NHTSA, on April 7, 1992, issued a notice of certification 
standards and test procedures for these devices. [44]    
 
II. Interlock Statutes and the Courts 
 
This part examines several interlock statutes along with both federal and state 
court challenges to them. 
 
 
 
A. Federal Law 
 
The federal government forcefully encouraged state acceptance of ignition 
interlocks when it enacted the TEA 21 Restoration Act on July 22, 1998. [45]   Section 
164 of the statue calls for the transfer of a portion of a state’s 23 U.S.C. § 104 federal 
highway construction funds to § 402 highway safety programs unless the state enacts a 
federally approved repeat intoxicated driver law. [46]   Section 164 sets forth the criteria 
that a state’s repeat intoxicated offender statute must meet in order to preserve its full § 
104 apportionment. [47]  
 
An approved "repeat intoxicated driver law" is a state law that provides for the 
following minimum penalties for a driver convicted of two or more DUI offenses.  The 
offender must receive a driver’s license suspension for not less than one year. [48]   Each 
of the driver’s vehicles must be impounded, immobilized, or have an ignition interlock 
installed at the conclusion of the 1-year license suspension. [49]   The state must assess 
the driver’s level of alcohol abuse and treatment. [50]   Finally, the state’s repeat 
intoxicated driver law must mandate certain minimum levels of community service or 
periods of incarceration, depending on the number of previous convictions. [51] 
Determination of each state's compliance with these provisions rests with the Secretary of 
the Department of Transportation. [52]  
 
Upon enactment of the federal rules for enforcing the TEA 21 Restoration Act on 
October 4, 2000, only 12 states required repeat DUI offenders to install an ignition 
interlock at the close of their license suspension. [53]   Today, over forty states satisfy the 
§ 164 impoundment-immobilization-interlock provision through the interlock 
requirement. [54]  
 
B. Challenges to Interlock Programs in State Courts 
 
California became the first state to enact an ignition interlock statute in 1986. [55]   
Today, the California Vehicle Code mandates the installation of an interlock device for a 
subsequent DUI conviction, and it grants the courts discretion to order installation for a 
first offense. [56] A multiple offender must install an interlock in every vehicle that he 
owns or operates for a period not to exceed three years. [57]   California’s interlock 
statute provides for several “interest of justice” exceptions including one catch-all 
provision enabling the court to balance the hardship imposed on the offender with the 
likelihood that she will drink and drive again. [58]   This allows, but does not require, 
each county to pay the interlock costs of the indigent. [59]  
 
Since the adoption of its first interlock statute in 1986, a significant challenge to 
the California law has yet to reach its courts. Since 1985, only two published California 
opinions have so much as mentioned the statute.   In People v. Gangemi, the Court of 
Appeal approvingly cited § 1203.1b of the vehicle code, which requires the DUI offender 
to pay for her interlock, as an example of the legislature properly requiring a probationer 
to pay her probation expenses. [60]   Similarly, in People v. Calvert, the same court noted 
the state’s specifications for signs advertising the installation of ignition interlocks to 
show that automobile repair shops are a closely regulated business. [61]   While 
California’s interlock statute may not have yet faced a serious constitutional challenge, it 
has at least withstood the test of time.   
 
New York's interlock statute has had a court history of interpretation very similar 
to California’s, i.e. silence.  However, its statute differs in one significant aspect in that 
requiring the DUI offender to install the device is totally discretionary with the court. 
[62] For this reason, New York does not comply with the TEA 21 Restoration Act's 
impoundment-immobilization-interlock provision via its interlock statute. [63]   While no 
published New York opinion rules on a challenge to its interlock statute, one decision by 
the state's highest court devotes a few paragraphs of dicta to the subject in People v. 
Letterlough. [64]  
 
In Letterlough, the court considered whether a trial court could require a six-time 
drunk driving offender to attach a fluorescent sign to his license plate reading "convicted 
dwi." [65]   At issue in the case was whether the courts authority to require a defendant to 
"satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation," comported with the 
state's penal law governing conditions of probation. [66] In rejecting a lower court's 
ruling that this "catch-all provision" permitted the court to fashion such a remedy, the 
Court of Appeals, favorably cited the state's interlock statute. [67]  
 
The Letterlough court used the recent enactment of the state's interlock statute to 
show that the legislature was aware of the innovative tools available to combat recidivist 
drunk driving. [68]   The court further noted that the legislature, by passing the interlock 
statute, clearly viewed that enabling legislation must authorize the court's authority to 
permit a case-by-case inquiry on whether to order installation of an interlock. [69]   For 
this reason, the court rejected the notion that requiring a driver to attach a "convicted 
dwi" sign to his license plate is permitted in the absence of a positive grant of authority 
from the legislature. [70]   
 
While the interlock statute was not at issue in Letterlough, it nevertheless strongly 
suggested that a majority of justices on New York's highest court are favorably inclined 
towards the interlock program.  Certainly, had a majority on the court felt that the statute 
might be constitutionally unsound, they would not have used it as an example of an 
appropriate DUI sanction.  At the very least, New York’s and California's interlock 
statutes have met with passive acceptance by the courts. [71]   In other states, the 
interlock challenge was more substantial. 
 
In an Ohio case, a DUI defendant challenged a lower court’s finding that the 
arresting police officer had probable cause to arrest him for DUI. [72]   During a traffic 
stop of the defendant’s vehicle, the officer noticed an ignition interlock device connected 
to an air compressor. [73]   Suspecting that the driver had used the compressor to provide 
a bogus air sample, the officer asked him to start his vehicle by blowing into the device. 
[74]   When the driver could not start his vehicle, the officer placed him under arrest for 
DUI. [75]   In affirming the DUI conviction, the appellate court considered the 
defendant’s inability to start his vehicle with the interlock one of the key elements in 
determining probable cause for arrest. [76]  
 
In another Ohio case, City of Lakewood v. Hartman, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
squarely turned back a challenge to the state's interlock program. [77]   In City of 
Lakewood, the sole issue before the court was whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in ordering the installation of an interlock when the defendant pled guilty to driving with 
a suspended license. [78]   In this case, the appellant did not directly challenge Ohio’s 
interlock statute, since her offense, driving with a suspended license, was not alcohol 
related. [79]   Here, as in New York's Letterlough, [80] the appellant challenged the lower 
court’s interlock order as being beyond the court’s authority granted under Ohio's 
catchall probation provision. [81]    
 
In affirming the order, the City of Lakewood court reasoned that installation of an 
interlock was an appropriate probation condition. [82]   Although her conviction was not 
alcohol related, the court found a sufficient nexus between the court's order and the 
reason for her license suspension her four previous DUI convictions. [83]   The City of 
Lakewood court viewed the interlock as a means to achieve two acceptable goals of 
probation conditions: protecting others from her irresponsibility, and deterring her from 
future criminal behavior. [84]   The Ohio court also expressed its satisfaction with the 
rehabilitative value of the interlock program.  It pointed out that the defendant faced a 
much harsher sentencing alternative: six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. [85]   The court 
opined that installing an interlock permitted the defendant, a single mother, to continue 
working and caring for her children, something the traditional sentencing scheme would 
not permit. [86]  
 
In another important interlock case, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld an equal 
protection challenge to its interlock statute in Iowa Department of Transportation v. Iowa 
District Court for Pottawattamie County (hereinafter "Pottawattamie County"). [87]   In 
Pottawattamie County, the appellant argued that the trial court erred in ruling that he was 
ineligible to participate in the interlock program. [88]   Central to his challenge was the 
lower court’s interpretation of Iowa’s interlock statute, § 321J.4, [89] in light of the 
motor vehicle habitual offender law, § 321.555. [90]  
 
Iowa's motor vehicle law defines a "habitual offender" as anyone accumulating 
three or more DUI convictions within a six-year period, driving with a suspended license, 
or a half dozen other vehicle-related offenses. [91]   The statute provides for the 
revocation of the offender’s license for a period of two to six years, depending on the 
nature of the underlying offenses. [92]    Passage of the state interlock statute created an 
exception to a portion of the habitual offender law. [93]   The interlock statute provides 
that any person having three DUI convictions or three suspended license convictions may 
apply for a restricted license upon proof of installation of an ignition interlock. [94]   The 
defendant in Pottawattamie County had one DUI conviction and two suspended license 
convictions; consequently, the department of transportation revoked his license under the 
habitual offender statute and ruled him ineligible for the interlock program. [95]  
 
The defendant challenged the interlock statute as irrational and as a violation of 
the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.  He argued that the 
Iowa legislature had no rational basis for discriminating between a habitual offender with 
three convictions for DUI or suspended license and an offender, such as the defendant, 
with one DUI and two license suspensions. [96]   In rejecting this challenge, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa applied traditional equal protection analysis using the rational basis test. 
[97]  
 
Under the rational basis test, the challenged statutory classification is permissible 
if it rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. [98]   The law is presumed constitutional 
and every lingering doubt is resolved in favor of the state. [99] The defendant "must 
negate every conceivable basis which may support the classification and the classification 
must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no relationship to the legitimate 
governmental interest." [100]   Applying this test, the Pottawattamie County court 
concluded that the legislature could rationally determine that a habitual offender with one 
DUI conviction and two suspended license convictions deserves different treatment than 
a defendant with three convictions for the same offense. [101]     The Iowa court, 
therefore, affirmed the constitutionality of the interlock statute. [102]  
 
More recently, in Meanor v. State, a convicted DUI driver called upon 
Maryland’s highest court to determine whether Maryland's new interlock program [103] 
changed the advice that police must give a driver who refuses to take a blood alcohol test. 
[104]   Maryland law requires that an officer inform such a driver of the “administrative 
sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test.” [105] Meanor argued that his 
BAC test was inadmissible because the police officer failed to inform him of the 
consequences of not taking the test, in light of Maryland's new interlock program. [106] 
Meanor challenged the admissibility of his test results because the arresting officer 
informed him only of the mandatory license suspension and not the possibility of 
obtaining an interlock-restricted license. [107]   In rejecting his argument, the Meanor 
court relied on an earlier opinion defining a "sanction" as "an outcome that is certain to 
happen." [108]   Since a driver's eligibility to participate in the interlock program is 
subject to the discretion of the motor vehicle administration, an interlock-restricted 
license is not a "sanction" under Maryland law. [109]   Consequently, the court held that 
the state’s new interlock law had no effect on the advice an arresting officer must give a 
DUI driver regarding refusal to take a BAC test. [110]  
 
III. Challenging Interlock Statutes: A Lost Cause? 
 
How is it that not a single state's ignition interlock program has been successfully 
challenged? Perhaps it is simply because challenging the statute would do more harm to 
the recidivist DUI driver than good.  Having a driver's license is a privilege, not a right. 
[111]   As such, state legislatures have broad authority in fashioning remedies to the 
problem of drunk drivers.  These include seizure of the vehicle, suspension or even 
permanent revocation of the driver's license, and, today, requiring the driver to install an 
ignition interlock in his vehicle.  In many ways, a court order to install an ignition 
interlock is the DUI driver's best alternative. 
 
This part examines some of the reasons why a DUI driver is unlikely to challenge 
an interlock statute by reviewing some of the alternative remedies state courts have in 
dealing with drunk drivers.  To argue against an order to install an interlock is equivalent 
to arguing for total revocation of driving privileges or even seizure of the driver's vehicle.   
This part concludes by examining whether a constitutional challenge is appropriate, 
should a driver wish to challenge an interlock statute. 
 
A. Fate Worse than Interlocks: Vehicle Forfeiture 
 
Thirty-three states authorize seizure of the vehicles of repeat DUI offenders. [112]   
New York City has even taken the draconian step of seizing the vehicles of first-time 
offenders. [113] A first-time offender unsuccessfully challenged this policy in Grinberg 
v. Safir. [114]    
 
On February 21, 1999, a police officer arrested Grinberg for driving while 
intoxicated following a traffic stop. [115] Police administered a sobriety test, which 
indicated a BAC of 0.11, and they seized Grinberg’s vehicle for forfeiture, pursuant to 
New York City Code (“NYC Code”). [116]   NYC Code directs that property “suspected 
of being used as a means of committing crime or employed in aid or furtherance of 
crime…shall be given "into the custody of the Police Department property clerk." [117] 
In denying Grinberg’s petition for the return of the vehicle, the court upheld the 
forfeiture, despite the lack of a pre-seizure hearing or a criminal conviction. [118]   "A 
drunk diver's automobile is the quintessential instrumentality of a crime "the sine qua non 
without which the crime could not have been committed." [119]   The court dispatched 
with Grinberg's claim that due process requires a pre-seizure hearing by relying on 
criteria set forth by the Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 
416 U.S. 663 (1974). [120]  
 
In Calero-Toledo, Puerto Rican authorities seized a leased yacht for transporting 
marijuana. [121] The court found pre-hearing seizure justified for two reasons.  First, the 
Calero-Toledo Court viewed the government’s interest in preventing the continued illicit 
use of property as sufficiently important to require prompt action. [122]   Second, the 
court reasoned that movable property like a boat might be easily secreted to another 
jurisdiction if the government gave advance warning of seizure. [123]   That the owner of 
the property had no culpability was irrelevant to the court. [124]   The Calero-Toledo 
Court conceded that the lessor of the yacht was completely uninvolved with the lessee’s 
crimes. [125]   However, the court considered it settled law, since the time of the Old 
Testament that no innocent owner defense exists for forfeiture. [126] The court grounded 
this holding on the notion that the property itself is the offender, not the owner. [127]    
 
Based on these considerations, the New York court in Grinberg denied the first-
time DUI driver's petition for the return of his forfeited vehicle, despite the absence of a 
pre-seizure hearing or a criminal conviction. [128] In affirming this harsh result, the court 
noted several factors that militate against property being wrongfully seized.  First, the 
arresting officers are not creditors, therefore, they have no economic incentive to seize a 
vehicle. [129]   In addition, because DUI is necessarily an offense committed in the 
presence of the arresting officer, the heightened probable cause standard for arrest 
controls the officer’s actions. [130]   Finally, the results of the blood alcohol test provide 
added indicia of reliability. [131]   While commentators have harshly criticized vehicle 
forfeiture of first time DUI offenders, [132] forfeiture for recidivist offenders generates 
much less debate. [133]   Furthermore, any chance of the Supreme Court adopting a more 
restrictive view towards contraband forfeitures is unlikely given its recent decision in 
Florida v. White. [134]   In White, the Court upheld seizure of an automobile used to 
deliver cocaine, even though the seizure occurred months later, when the owner was 
arrested on unrelated charges. [135]   Seizure of a DUI offender’s vehicle remains a 
firmly established remedy available to the state. [136]  
 
B. Constitutional Challenges 
 
A DUI driver required to install an ignition interlock is free to assert an equal 
protection challenge to the court's order.  Possible grounds include unjust discrimination 
against recidivist DUI drivers, alcoholics, or maybe the poor.  A constitutional challenge 
to an interlock statute faces a steep uphill battle because having a driver's license is not a 
fundamental right and because of the judicial deference generally accorded public 
welfare and social legislation.  This section reviews constitutional challenges to interlock 
statutes.  
 
The Supreme Court reviewed its three-tiered approach to equal protection cases in 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).  The Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [137] requires that "all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike." [138] "The general rule is that legislation is presumed valid and 
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest." [139] This rule yields to a much tougher standard of "strict 
scrutiny" when the classification seldom relates to any legitimate state interest. [140]   
For example, distinctions based on "race, alienage, or national origin" are immediately 
suspect as their basis is usually prejudice. [141]   The same standard of strict scrutiny also 
applies when the state law infringes upon a fundamental right secured by the 
Constitution. [142]    In these situations, the need for judicial intervention is more urgent, 
and the court will act unless the state shows that its law is narrowly tailored to address a 
compelling state interest. [143]   Between theses two levels of scrutiny is a heightened 
standard of review when the disputed classification "generally provides no sensible 
ground for differential treatment." [144]   When the classification concerns gender or 
illegitimacy, which are unrelated to a person’s "ability to perform or contribute to 
society," the "classification fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently 
important governmental interest." [145]  
 
As discussed supra, the Supreme Court of Iowa in Pottawattamie County rejected 
an equal protection challenge by holding that its legislature could rationally discriminate 
between persons having different prior convictions in determining eligibility for the 
interlock program. [146]    
 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin likewise rejected an equal protect challenge 
from a hearing impaired driver who claimed that non-hearing impaired drivers better 
understand the cautionary instructions police give regarding refusal to take a blood 
alcohol test. [147]   The court rejected the assertion that the state needed to provide a 
certified sign-language expert to communicate the instructions. [148]   It held that the 
officer needed only to make a reasonable accommodation for the hearing impaired driver, 
such as communicating in writing. [149]  
 
While no person has yet raised an interlock challenge on the basis that it 
discriminates against alcoholics, such a claim would likely fail.  Federal courts of appeal 
have decisively held that alcoholism is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, 
therefore, laws regulating access to government benefits for alcoholics need only satisfy 
the lowest level of scrutiny, a rational basis test. [150]   Given this result, an equal 
protection challenge based on alcoholism would likely fail because the interlock statute 
rationally relates to the legitimate governmental interest of promoting highway safety. 
 
Equal protection challenges based on age, such as special penalties for offenders 
under the age of 21, [151] or wealth would face a rational basis test, since neither age 
[152] nor wealth [153] is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. That wealth is not a 
suspect classification is particularly important because it means poverty, or inability to 
afford the interlock, is unlikely to be the basis of a successful constitutional challenge.  
While this may seem like a harsh result, it is far less oppressive than outright forfeiture of 
the vehicle, a legally sanctioned remedy.  
 
Constitutional challenges based on other strategies would be equally difficult to 
sustain since operating a motor vehicle is not a fundamental right. [154]   The Supreme 
Court made this clear in Mackey v. Montrym wherein it upheld a Massachusetts statute 
summarily requiring license suspension for refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test 
upon arrest for DUI. [155]   While the Court recognized that a driver's license embodies a 
property interest sufficient to raise Due Process concerns, it ruled that the state interest in 
protecting public safety is paramount. [156]   Central to the Mackey Court's reasoning 
was that refusing to take a blood alcohol test is such an unambiguous and verifiable event 
that the risk of error is minimal, particularly given the probable cause hurdle required for 
the arrest. [157]    For the Mackey Court, the likelihood of an officer deliberately 
fabricating facts or misinterpreting intoxication is "insubstantial." [158]   Recognizing the 
need for the state to remove drunk drivers from the road at "the earliest possible 
moment," the Court held that the state could properly dispense with a pre-seizure hearing. 
[159]   As for protecting the driver's interests, the Court found that a "prompt post 
deprivation review" was adequate. [160]  
 
IV. A Universal Interlock Program 
 
This part examines the consequences of universal interlock installation.  It begins 
with a look at the motivations and the benefits for using such a mechanism.  Next, it 
frankly examines several privacy and liability concerns that should be addressed in order 
for such a program to gain widespread support.  Finally, it concludes with several 
recommendations aimed at addressing these concerns. 
 
A. The Benefits 
 
Each year there are approximately 16,000 alcohol-related fatalities on America's 
highways. [161]   In 1999, someone died in an alcohol-related crash every 33 
minutes.161a In 1998, there were 16,189 alcohol-related highway fatalities.161b In 78% 
of those cases, the deceased was legally intoxicated. [162] Alcohol-related, fatal traffic 
accidents cost Americans a staggering $50 billion annually in medical expenses, property 
damage, lost productivity, and other expenses. [163]   If a universal interlock program 
targeted only legally intoxicated drivers, up to 12,000 lives and $40 billion could be 
saved annually. [164]  
 
In order to put this number of saved lives in perspective, consider the benefits of 
air bags.  Air bags first became standard equipment in the 1985 model year. [165]   Since 
the 1999 model year, all cars and light trucks were required to have dual air bags, 
although the majority of all new vehicles already had dual air bags by the 1995 model 
year. [166]    While air bags are considered highly effective in reducing fatalities, the 
overall number of lives saved by air bags pales in comparison to what could be achieved 
with interlocks. 
 
During the period between 1986 and March 1, 2000, air bags have saved 5,303 
lives. [167]   If all vehicles on the road had dual air bags, NHTSA estimates that they 
would save up to 3,200 lives annually. [168]   Unfortunately, the efficacy of air bags is 
highly dependent on the use of seat belts, and the NHTSA estimate assumes 100% seat 
belt usage. [169]   Given that the actual seat belt usage rate is 67%, the number of 
potential lives saved annually could drop to as low as 1,600. [170]   These figures show 
that the maximum number of lives saved by installing air bags is only one-tenth the 
16,000 lives that could potentially be saved with interlocks.  Even seat belts, which are 
practically the sine qua non of motor vehicle safety, save only an estimated 9,500 lives a 
year, [171] just a fraction of the potential number of lives saved by installing interlocks.   
 
With statistics like these, Congress will likely take a hard look at requiring an 
alcohol ignition interlock in every vehicle.  Before this bandwagon gains too much 
momentum, a look at some drawbacks of an interlock program is in order. 
 
B. Universal Interlocks: A Plaintiff 's Best Friend? 
 
Few people could probably say that they have never gotten behind the wheel of a 
car after taking a drink. Unfortunately for the defendant, his interlock companion will be 
recording every sip for the plaintiff's attorney to present to the jury. 
 
A BAC of 0.10 is sufficient for a DUI conviction in all fifty states, but actual 
impairment occurs at much lower levels.  A recent NHTSA-sponsored study showed that 
some impairment begins at only 0.02. [172] A major finding of the study was that a BAC 
of only 0.04 degrades driving performance by every measure of impairment. [173] The 
report concludes by noting that there is no scientific evidence to suggest that there is any 
impairment-free blood alcohol concentration. [174]   Based on these results, one could 
argue that a person is negligent for driving after taking even a single drink, although the 
case is much stronger if the BAC is 0.04. 
 
The pitfalls of having an on-board data recorder in a vehicle, while perhaps not 
widely recognized, are not new.  Last year, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with 
such an issue in Harris v. General Motors Corporation. [175]   In that case, Harris sued 
General Motors ("GM"), alleging that the air bag of her vehicle deployed as she was 
reaching for the ignition switch, thereby breaking her arm. [176]   Before trial, GM 
successfully moved for summary judgment using data retrieved from the car's 
"Diagnostic Energy Reserve Module," or "DERM." [177]   In an affidavit, one of GM's 
engineers used data downloaded from the DERM to refute the plaintiff's version of the 
events preceding air bag deployment. [178]   Although the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded the case for trial, [179] the case served as notice for trial attorneys that a new 
vehicle crash data battle is looming. [180]  
 
While most plaintiff attorneys do not even know about motor vehicle "black 
boxes," the devices have been around since 1974, and today GM alone has installed over 
six million in its vehicles. [181]   The reason for these devices is perfectly logical.  
Manufacturer's need crash data to improve vehicle safety, particularly for improving air 
bags. [182]   This work has received the active encouragement of the National 
Transportation Safety Board as well as the NHTSA. [183]   Today’s black boxes record 
over a dozen vehicle parameters including: air bag status, seat belt status, engine speed, 
vehicle speed, brake status, and throttle position. [184]   While the intentions behind 
these devices are laudable, their praise has not been universal. [185]  
 
Obtaining the stored crash data requires a proprietary data decoder. [186]   In 
some situations, manufacturers have denied crash victims access to this data. [187]   
Since the vehicle owner is incapable of retrieving the data, he is unable to ensure that the 
data, once made available, is unaltered. [188]   Finally, an expert is necessary to interpret 
the data, which may present a formidable challenge when suing an automaker. [189]  
 
For alcohol ignition interlocks to gain widespread support, people will need 
assurance that their interlock-equipped vehicle will not drive them to financial ruin.  
While there has not been much of an outcry over vehicle "black boxes," the ones that 
monitor many parameters have only been around since 1999, and most people are 
unaware of their existence.  However, other high-tech, vehicle-monitoring gadgets have 
generated significant controversy.  
 
One case in point is cameras that automatically ticket drivers who run red lights at 
intersections.  Since San Diego installed such a system three years ago, the city has 
issued 84,000 tickets averaging $271 each. [190]   Advocates of the program have 
dismissed their opponents as "politicians with a Libertarian bent." [191] However, the 
Los Angeles Times reported that a camera sensor defect has resulted in the suspension of 
the program and the "dismissal of hundreds of traffic citations." [192]   Even the city's 
police union joined the chorus of opponents after five on-duty officers received fines. 
[193]  
 
As technology advances so does the ability to monitor driver behavior.  AirIQ, 
Inc. markets a vehicle monitoring system that uses a satellite Global Positioning System 
(GPS) to track a vehicle's location to within 100 yards. [194]   By coupling the GPS with 
an on-board data recorder, AirIQ's device enables someone to retrieve a report 
documenting a vehicle's location, speed, and direction in five-minute intervals. [195] 
AirIQ's website touts its system as being able to locate overdue vehicles, enforce 
geographical driver restrictions, and monitor driver behavior.  It even boasts that the 
AirIQ system can disable a stolen vehicle with the "click of a mouse." [196]    Such 
powerful technology has come to the attention of owners of large commercial rental 
fleets. 
 
Using this technology, Budget Rent a Car readily found one of its cars, due in at a 
California franchise, across the country in Louisiana. [197] The Thrifty Rental Company 
learned that one of its customers was speeding at 100 mph before having an accident. 
[198] Budget Rent a Car Corp. is also using vehicle-monitoring technology, purportedly 
to prevent theft, although a company spokeswoman could not "speak for the individual 
franchises and how they use the system." [199]   In perhaps the ultimate marriage of 
technology with corporate hubris, Acme Rent-a-Car in New Haven, Connecticut uses 
AirIQ's equipment to automatically fine its customer's $150 each time they exceed the 
speed limit. [200]   One unfortunate lessee missed this provision in the rental agreement 
and became aware of it only after his credit card issuer froze his account because of three 
successive $150 debits. [201]   The Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection has 
since joined Acme's hasty customer in his legal action against Acme Rent-a-Car. [202]  
 
C. Guidelines: Protecting Privacy and Avoiding Crippling Liability 
 
People do not like being treated like criminals.  How will the average driver feel 
about having to prove that he is not violating a DUI law every time he uses his vehicle?  
Steven Wisotsky, in an article for Cato Research Ltd., decried America's "war on drugs" 
as turning our country into a "society of suspects." [203] He cites specific examples of 
how the war-like, get-tough, "crackdown mentality" is permeating our criminal justice 
system.203a To demonstrate this, Wisotsky lists such war-like measures as the 
kidnapping of persons from foreign countries to stand trial on drug charges in the United 
States, body cavity searches by customs agents, and mandatory life sentences for first-
time drug offenders. [204]   To Mr. Wisotsky, these measures are evidence that there now 
exists a "drug exception" to the Bill of Rights. [205]  
 
Interlock advocates may best serve their cause by refraining from drawing 
analogies with the United States' controversial war on drugs.  They should recognize that 
just as there is certainly no drug exception to the Bill of Rights, neither is there a drunk 
driving exception.  Proponents of universal interlock programs should adopt some clear 
privacy safeguards along with their interlock advocacy.  Furthermore, few people will 
likely support ignition interlocks if taking a single drink automatically exposes them to 
crippling civil liability.  This subsection proposes a few such safeguards. 
 
One way to safeguard the public is to remove the data recording capability from 
the interlock.  While this feature is necessary to monitor a DUI offender's compliance 
with the conditions of her probation, it serves no useful purpose for the general 
population.  Checking for attempts to disable the system could be part of an annual 
vehicle inspection.  Only the DUI offender should suffer much more invasive driver 
monitoring technology. [206]    
 
From time to time, a non-DUI offender will operate a vehicle having full data 
recording features.  Perhaps he will borrow the car of an offender or rent a commercial 
vehicle having extensive driver monitoring capabilities.  In these situations, statutory 
safeguards are necessary.  Thanks to existing DUI laws such provisions are already in 
place.  As an example, a subsection of Pennsylvania's DUI statute provides the 
following:[207]  
(d) Presumptions from amount of alcohol.--If chemical testing of a person's 
breath, blood or urine shows: 
(1) That the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of an adult is 0.05% or 
less, it shall be presumed that the adult was not under the influence of alcohol and 
the adult shall not be charged with any violation under section 3731(a)(1), (4) or 
(5) (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance), or, if 
the adult was so charged prior to the test, the charge shall be void ab initio. 
(2) That the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of an adult is in excess of 
0.05% but less than 0.10%, this fact shall not give rise to any presumption that the 
adult was or was not under the influence of alcohol, but this fact may be 
considered with other competent evidence in determining whether the adult was 
or was not under the influence of alcohol. 
 
Pennsylvania’s vehicle code creates an irrefutable statutory presumption that a 
person with a BAC of 0.05 is not an impaired driver.  Admittedly, this presumption 
conflicts with the medical evidence, which shows that there is some impairment with a 
BAC as low as 0.02, but there is a rational basis for it.  The legislature balances public 
safety with the legitimate interest in avoiding vexatious lawsuits.  For intermediate blood 
alcohol levels, the Pennsylvania statute is presumptively neutral.  In a civil suit, this 
places the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to show impairment.   
 
By adopting reasonable measures such as this, a driver will not be blind-sided 
with a financially ruinous lawsuit for having one or two drinks. In order for a universal 
interlock program to gain support, certain safeguards are necessary.  No person will feel 
comfortable if his vehicle has the potential to become a plaintiff's star witness.  Interlock 
advocates might best serve their cause by developing clear measures aimed at preserving 
the privacy of innocent drivers early in their cause. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Alcohol ignition interlocks have the potential to achieve something that no 
governmental agency, health care facility, 12-step program, or concerned spouse has 
accomplished—prevent a person from driving drunk.  Thanks to recent advances in 
technology, circumvention of interlocks is becoming much more difficult. Interlocks 
offer a powerful new option in dealing with the habitual DUI offender.  Interlocks are not 
only constitutionally permissible, but the offender is likely to prefer them to other firmly 
established remedies such as indefinite license revocation or summary vehicle forfeiture.  
 
Approximately 16,000 people die each year in alcohol-related accidents on the 
United States' highways. Interlocks have the potential to save more lives annually than 
seat belts and air bags combined.  With these considerations in mind, it is only a matter of 
time before some form of universal interlock program gains momentum.  This raises not 
only serious privacy concerns, but financial ones as well.  No person is likely to support 
an interlock initiative if he feels spied on or if he might suffer ruinous financial liability.  
Therefore, carefully crafted statutory safeguards should be the cornerstone of any viable 
universal interlock program.     
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